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Abstract 
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was a neoconservative Washington, 
D.C. foreign policy think tank, comprised of seasoned foreign policy stalwarts who had served 
multiple presidential administrations as well as outside-the-beltway defense contractors, that was 
founded in 1997 by William Kristol, editor of the conservative political magazine The Weekly 
Standard, and Robert Kagan, a foreign policy analyst and political commentator currently at the 
Brookings Institution.  The PNAC would shut down its operations in 2006.  Using The Weekly 
Standard as its mouthpiece, the PNAC helped foment support for the removal of Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein beginning in 1998, citing Iraq’s noncooperation with UN weapons inspections.  
The PNAC became further emboldened in its urgency and rhetoric to quell the geopolitical risk 
posed by Hussein after the 9/11 terror attacks.  The only justifiable response the George W. Bush 
Administration could play in thwarting Hussein, the PNAC argued, involved a military action. 
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Introduction 
This thesis aims to examine the role played by the architects of the Iraq War of 2003 both 
inside and outside the Bush Administration with specific focus on the analysis and insight 
posited by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) as part of a larger plan of 
strategically asserting American interests in the Middle East before and after the 9/11 terror 
attacks.  In the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Communism, 
neoconservatives exalted America’s elevated position as the lone superpower in a unipolar 
world.  With unrivaled US hegemony heralding with it added global responsibilities, 
neoconservatives including the PNAC stressed on America reenergizing its military might to 
ensure the security of US strategic interests abroad with specific attention placed on dislodging 
Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq.  This thesis will also attempt to translate both the 
political and world philosophies related to foreign policy and US international relations that the 
PNAC ideologues held vital to the mission of the PNAC as well as how those philosophies 
manifested into the Bush Administration’s rationale to go to war against Iraq in 2003. 
The Iraq War of 2003 and the subject of the PNAC remain a rather contemporary area of 
study.  Notwithstanding, the areas of focus in this thesis related to the run-up to war and the 
consequential fallout from the Iraq War have been deeply researched by academics, public policy 
thinkers, political scientists, and politicians.  The vast majority of source collections and 
secondary literature used in the production of this thesis was published after the 2003 invasion.  
However, the scope and reach the PNAC had in motivating the Clinton and Bush administrations 
to heed the PNAC’s arguments for waging regime change in Iraq has gone largely understated.  
The memoirs analyzed for this thesis, many written by PNAC members who also served on 
President Bush’s cabinet, do not mention the presence and, furthermore, relevance the PNAC 
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wielded in the run-up to the Iraq War.  Influential media outlets such as the New York Times and 
The Washington Post, through op-eds written by key members of the PNAC including Paul 
Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad, echoed the PNAC’s arguments to a wider audience in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, but never mentioned the PNAC outright.  The two newspapers facilitated 
as outlets for neoconservatives, Republican hawks, and policy thinkers to vent their frustrations 
in what they perceived as the Clinton Administration’s tepid inaction regarding Iraq in addition 
to the United Nations’ stagnant containment strategy over Iraq’s WMD (weapons of mass 
destruction) programs.  While the advocacy journalism of the PNAC’s neoconservative 
mainstays is revealing, their memoirs are exercises in covering their tracks. 
The two primary source archives utilized for this thesis, the Central Intelligence Agency 
and the National Security Archives, provide intelligence and analysis concerning Iraq’s WMD 
programs in addition to the evolution of US war plans and strategies against Iraq stretching from 
the 1990s into the 2000s.  The role of the CIA, in tandem with the Bush Administration’s 
argument for war against Iraq, was to gather and dispense credible intelligence highlighting the 
scope and scale of Iraq’s WMD programs to the Bush Administration who, in turn, would mold 
the intelligence-reporting into policymaking.  Former CIA Director George Tenet stressed 
throughout his memoir that CIA intelligence-gathering is not structured around nor caters to any 
biases toward specific US policy.1 
Some valuable scholarly writing is available on neoconservative influence.  Whereas 
Justin Vaïsse maps out the trajectory of the neoconservative movement through three distinct 
waves, journalist James Mann and historians Terry Anderson and Richard Immerman detail the 
meteoric rise to political power experienced by members of the PNAC and the second Bush 
                                                          
1 George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2007).   
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Administration.2  Vaïsse lays out the philosophy of neo-conservatism and the traction that it 
drew through the second half of the 20th Century in the same way that Mann, Immerman, and 
Anderson analyze the personal philosophies that drove PNAC members and Bush 
Administration officials to keep striving for greater influence and weightier decision-making.   
Richard Perle, William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, and Robert Kagan, meanwhile, expound upon 
their own personal weltanschauung while delving deep into their public recommendations for 
enhanced geopolitical security with their own writings that read more like biased foreign policy 
manifestos than balanced perspectives rooted in academic empiricism.  Little useful literature is 
available on the role of think tanks as related to the foreign policy formulated by the George W. 
Bush Administration.       
The Mission Statement of the PNAC 
On June 3, 1997, the Project for the New American Century published a document 
entitled “PNAC- Statement of Principles.”3  From its outset, the document was critical of 
Clinton-era American foreign and defense policies, labeling them as “adrift.”4  The PNAC 
viewed the Clinton Administration as lacking in confronting present threats and thereby 
jeopardizing American security interests in the long run.  Included in the criticism were 
conservatives whom the PNAC deemed as not having voiced and advanced a strategic vision of 
America’s role in the world.  The aim of this document was to make the case for fostering and 
rallying American global leadership. 
                                                          
2 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 
2004); Terry H. Anderson, Bush’s Wars (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); Richard H. Immerman, “Paul 
Wolfowitz and the Lonely Empire,” in Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin 
to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 196-231.    
3 Project for the New American Century, “PNAC-----Statement of Principles,” rrojasdatabank.info, 3 June 
1997 <http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/pfpc/PNAC---statement%20of%20principles.pdf> (3 May 2015), 1-2.  
4 Ibid, 1. 
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A big question looming over the PNAC when it created their “Statement of Principles” 
was where did America stand at the present time as the world’s preeminent power after having 
won the Cold War?  In highlighting their concern of diminished US preeminence, the PNAC 
cited cuts in defense spending, inattention to state diplomacy, and unreliable leadership as all 
being hindrances to appropriate US foreign influence.  The main purpose that the public policy 
organization established for itself was to provide a perspective built upon the belief that US 
“military supremacy trumped everything” geared toward the strategic, military, and diplomatic 
role the United States ought to play as the lone superpower in a unipolar, post-Cold War global 
political landscape heading into the 21st Century with overwhelming emphasis placed on military 
strategy.5  Echoing the achievements of the Reagan Administration, the PNAC expressed 
prudence in establishing a foreign policy that both boldly and purposefully promoted American 
principles abroad.  The PNAC warned that shrinking from American responsibilities invited 
challenges to American fundamental interests.6  The overarching mission the PNAC undertook 
for itself was to “preserve and reinforce ‘America’s benevolent global hegemony.’”7   
The “Statement of Principles” concluded with the PNAC stressing four lessons along 
with their associated consequences that all Americans ought to be made aware of.  Firstly, the 
pursuance of US global responsibilities by a modernized military equipped for 21st century 
warfare would be achievable only if defense spending increased significantly.  Secondly, 
diplomatic ties with allies must be strengthened and regimes hostile to US interests and values 
must be challenged.  Thirdly, the US had to promote political and economic freedom abroad.  
Lastly, America needed to recognize its responsibility and unique position in preserving and 
                                                          
5 Immerman, Empire for Liberty, 218.   
6 Project for the New American Century, “PNAC-----Statement of Principles,” 1. 
7 Immerman, Empire for Liberty, 220.  
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extending an “international order” that behooved US security, prosperity, and principles.  The 
PNAC was emulating a Reaganite foreign policy approach that would translate past successes of 
the Reagan administration into a resurgence of American greatness going into the next century.  
At the bottom of the document could be found the document’s signatories including Richard 
Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.8 
In the Beginning: A Brief History of Neoconservatism 
The PNAC had its foreign policy ideologies and doctrines wedded to the tenets of neo-
conservatism, a term coined by historian Marvin Meyers as being not a “movement” but rather a 
“persuasion.”9  Irving Kristol, the godfather of advancing the political philosophy of neo-
conservatism and father of future PNAC founder and Weekly Standard editor, William Kristol, 
once memorably remarked that neo-conservatives were liberals who had been “mugged by 
reality.”10  The champions of neo-conservatism in the 20th century included Theodore Roosevelt 
and Ronald Reagan, who had built their political platforms upon the virtues of hope, 
progressiveness, and prosperity.  As a result, the neoconservatives’ public policies became 
popular with Republican presidents.  Neoconservatives familiarized themselves with intellectual 
history, recommended large budget surpluses, and favored cutting taxes.11  Specifically, among 
their list of domestic priorities, was the belief that there should not be an overreliance on welfare 
services that carried the capability of transforming the nation into a welfare state.12 
                                                          
8 Project for the New American Century, “PNAC-----Statement of Principles,” 2.  
9 Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion: What it was, and what it is,” The Weekly Standard 8, no. 
47 (2003): 1-3. 
10 Max Boot, “Neocons,” Foreign Policy, no. 140 (January-February 2004): 20-22, 24, 26, 28. 
11 Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion,” 1. 
12 Ibid, 2. 
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During the late 1960s and into the early 1970s against the backdrop of nationwide 
escalating crime rates, the Soviet Union challenged the burgeoning US policy of détente to the 
utmost with its invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.  Democrats in Washington were not uneager 
to tackle those problems head-on.  A segment of Democrats even became fed up with the 
political impotence affecting Washington policymaking.13  Irving Kristol had once been a 
Trotskyist as a student at the City College of New York, while former United Nations 
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, considered a “hawkish Democrat,” had become disenchanted 
with the Democratic Party drifting further to the left in the 1970s.14 Another young Democrat, 
Richard Perle, who had served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan and 
later as a member of the PNAC all the while evolving into a leading neo-conservative was once 
aligned with Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a Democratic senator from Washington State who opposed 
the Nixon-Ford policy of détente.15  These are but three examples of neoconservatives originally 
wedded to the fundamentals of the Democratic Party who later became disillusioned and 
ultimately abandoned the party. 
Before the coalescence of the PNAC and the assemblage of the first installment of the 
national security team under the George W. Bush Administration, the members comprising both 
entities had long been carving their niches inside various Washington, D.C. policy circles.  The 
“Vulcans” as James Mann labeled them in his 2004 book The Rise of the Vulcans first began 
trickling into Washington, D.C. in 1968 at a precariously volatile period of heightened national 
anxieties stemming from the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam and over the uncertain 
future of American presidential leadership.  The Vulcans all believed in the “importance of 
                                                          
13 Boot, “Neocons,” 21. 
14 Ibid; see also Mann, Vulcans, 90-91.  
15 Boot, “Neocons,” 22; see also Mann, Vulcans, 32-33. 
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American military power” while concentrating on “traditional national security issues.”16  The 
non-negotiable, unifying factor amongst all the Vulcan cohort serving in and alongside the 
George W. Bush Administration was the belief that “American power and ideals are…a force of 
good in the world.”17  The Vulcans chose not to fret nor lament over “America’s abuses of 
power.”18  Rather, they prized overt American zeal over an “international order” in direct 
contrast to a diplomatic goal synonymous with the foreign policy approach of the Carter 
Administration.19  The Vulcans aligned with George W. Bush were a “successor generation of 
foreign policy officials” with scant experience serving in combat roles.20  The exceptions, in this 
case, were Colin Powell, US Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005, and Richard Armitage, US 
Deputy Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005, who had both served in the Vietnam War.                        
William Kristol, son of Irving Kristol, arrived in Washington in 1985 to begin working as 
an aide to Secretary of Education William Bennett in the Reagan Administration.21  Kristol was 
seen as an “intellectual heir” of one of the most distinguished “icons of the modern conservative 
movement,” Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago.22  Robert Kagan, son of longtime 
historian of Ancient Greece Donald Kagan of Yale University, received his PhD in American 
History from American University in Washington, D.C.  Donald Rumsfeld, a Princeton graduate, 
had served as defense secretary in the Ford Administration before transitioning to president and 
chief executive officer of G.D. Searle & Company, a leading pharmaceutical company based in 
Chicago during Rumsfeld’s tenure, in the late 1970s.23  Paul Wolfowitz, a disciple of acclaimed 
                                                          
16 Mann, Vulcans, xvi. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mann, Vulcans, 39. 
21 Ibid, 165. 
22 Ibid, 26.  
23 Ibid, 101. 
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University of Chicago political science professor Albert Wohlstetter who was regarded as one of 
America’s leading strategists of nuclear war and deterrence in the 1950s while working at the 
Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, had served as assistant secretary of state for East 
Asia and the Pacific during the Reagan years, reporting to Secretary of State George P. Shultz.24  
Prior to Reagan, Wolfowitz had served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for regional 
planning in the Carter Administration.25  It was while working under President Carter in the 
Pentagon that Wolfowitz began analyzing the potential geopolitical dangers and “security 
threats” posed by an “outsized” Iraqi military that dwarfed two neighboring American allies in 
the Persian Gulf, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.26  Richard Cheney had served as Secretary of 
Defense under President George H.W. Bush, playing a pivotal role in directing the planning for 
Operation Desert Storm.27  Colin Powell, a veteran of two tours in Vietnam, had risen to serve as 
President Reagan’s national security advisor and then afterwards returned to military life 
elevating to the rank of a four-star general in 1989 with the culmination of Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993.28                                
Neoconservatives, according to Irving Kristol, felt more comfortable displaying their 
American patriotism compared to other conservatives.29  Furthermore, Kristol argued that 
neoconservatives should not carry one set of foreign policy beliefs and viewpoints.  Rather, they 
should mold their current foreign policies based on the current state of international affairs while 
staying observant of the outcomes of past US foreign policy endeavors.30  Kristol realized that 
                                                          
24 Ibid, 29-30, 116. 
25 Immerman, Empire for Liberty, 204.   
26 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 129.   
27 Mann, Vulcans, 144. 
28 Ibid, 176. 
29 Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion,” 2. 
30 Ibid, 2. 
9 
 
the power the US wielded carried with it serious responsibility, and he reflected that the United 
States military budget ought to have remained in accordance with US economic growth.31  To 
Kristol, national interests ran parallel with ideological identity always exalting patriotism over 
the tyrannical threat posed by the installation of a world governing body like the United 
Nations.32  One critic wrote of neoconservative thought as being: 
not so much the product of a particular set of precepts or perceptions about the 
world and humanity as it is the product of a particular intellectual temperament 
[my emphasis].  It is a temperament that favors pugnacity, bold thinking, and 
grand encompassing visions of the world and the future.  It is a temperament that 
shuns complexity, tactical adjustment, and the role of patience in geopolitical 
maneuverings.33 
 
William Kristol and Robert Kagan never went through a “leftist phase.”34  They were 
products of what became known as “third wave neo-conservatism.”  In his book 
Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, French political scientist Justin Vaïsse writes 
that third wave neo-conservatism began in 1995.35  By that time, communism had met its demise 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and a unipolar world with America at the helm had 
come into effect.  The age of asymmetric warfare had dawned with rogue states such as Iran and 
Afghanistan and well-financed terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda presenting unique challenges to 
American national security and overseas interests.  In the 1990s, neoconservatives positioned 
themselves on the right of the Republican Party.36 
Columnist Charles Krauthammer had suggested that US military intervention would be 
necessary only where vital American interests were at stake.  In 1992, the Department of 
                                                          
31 Ibid, 3. 
32 Ibid, 2. 
33 Immerman, Empire for Liberty, 209. 
34 Boot, “Neocons,” 21. 
35 Justin Vaïsse, “The Third Age: National Greatness Conservatives,” in Neoconservatism: The Biography of 
a Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 220-270. 
36 Ibid, 220. 
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Defense released its annual Defense Planning Guidance drafted by Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad that stated that clear American military superiority 
would deter others from challenging US power abroad.  The text in the document laid out the 
neoconservative agenda towards a cataclysmic event such as 9/11.37 
Policy advisors from think tanks, specifically those working for the Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush presidencies, were seen as policy entrepreneurs as well as scholars working in 
alignment with power blocs, foundations, corporations, and partisan politics.38  Richard Cheney 
and Donald Rumsfeld were labelled as conservative hawks receptive to neoconservative 
viewpoints though neither of whom would classify himself as a neoconservative.  George W. 
Bush, viewed as a member of the “Christian Right,” and Richard Cheney, seen as a “fiscal 
conservative,” were in agreement with American-led, unilateral foreign policy initiatives in the 
neoconservative sense.39  They agreed with neoconservatives in the raising of defense spending; 
hardline, non-concessionary diplomacy; and military action if necessary.  Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld was the intermediary between neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and 
Richard Perle.40  From 2001 to 2003, Perle headed the Defense Policy Board, a “previously 
obscure body of dignitaries that provided advice (often unheeded) to the secretary of defense.”41  
Neoconservative think tanks received funding from corporations and politicians who 
were, in turn, supported by multinationals and arms producers keen in seeing their interests 
voiced through the analytical expertise offered by neoconservative think tanks.  Neoconservative 
                                                          
37 Ibid, 224. 
38 Kubilay Yado Arin, “The Impact of Neoconservative Think Tanks on American Foreign Policy,” in e-ir.info, 
26 May 2014 <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/26/the-impact-of-neoconservative-think-tanks-on-american-foreign-
policy/> (19 Aug. 2015).  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 56.   
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think tanks came to be regarded as “architects of an interventionist unilateralism,” endorsing 
military conflict.42  Paul Wolfowitz, who served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy under 
President George H.W. Bush and as Deputy Secretary of Defense under President George W. 
Bush, formulated the Bush Doctrine calling for the employment of pre-emptive attacks in order 
to protect threatened American interests.  The Bush Doctrine was formerly known as the 
Wolfowitz Doctrine.43 
The neoconservative slant of the Project for the New American Century was already 
evident in 1997, the year of the think tank’s founding.  Specifically, PNAC analysis explored the 
threat Saddam Hussein posed to the United States’ interests in the Middle East, UN weapons 
inspectors, and to America, itself, if Hussein were ever to acquire nuclear capabilities or have his 
own nuclear program advanced enough to produce a warhead.  This was reason enough for the 
PNAC to conclude that the United States ought to wage war against Iraq to secure democracy in 
that country and greater stability in the Middle East.  The removal of Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorial regime, the PNAC argued, would trigger democracy to ripple across the entire Arab 
world.  Other Arab states emulating American-branded democracy in Iraq would additionally 
cause Islamic extremism to recede, the PNAC contended.  An American military presence, 
according to neoconservative groups such as the PNAC, would uproot the authoritarianism 
across the Middle East that had so long been ingrained in the political fabric of that part of the 
world.44                                        
                                                          
42  Arin, “The Impact of Neoconservative Think Tanks on American Foreign Policy.”    
43 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 56; see also Mann, Vulcans, 76, 196.  
44 Mann, Vulcans, 76. 
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In September 1995, Bill Kristol launched the political magazine The Weekly Standard.45  
Right-wing media mogul Rupert Murdoch initially funded the publication.46  Two years later the 
neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century was founded by Kristol along 
with Robert Kagan and Gary Schmitt to advance the neoconservative agenda.47  Schmitt assumed 
the role of think tank director.48 During President Reagan’s second term, Schmitt had served as 
executive director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a stronghold of 
neoconservative political ideology.  Neocons such as Kristol exuded great political and media 
savvy.49  The Weekly Standard served as the perfect mouthpiece for the PNAC to express its 
firmly held views and recommendations on how the United States ought to conduct foreign 
policy heading into the 21st century. 
Emulating The Gipper’s Brand of Weltanschauung  
According to Kagan and Kristol, the United States must be in charge of guiding and 
shaping the world.50  To advance its unipolar international presence, the US had to enact a neo-
Reaganite foreign policy.51  This concept was expounded upon by Kagan and Kristol in a jointly 
written article entitled “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy” that appeared in the August 
1996 issue of the elite journal Foreign Affairs.  The theme of the article can be summed up with 
a question containing a subsequent, straightforward answer possessing possibly major 
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implications.  What should America’s international role be? The US must assume the role of 
“benevolent global hegemony.”52 
“Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy” exalted the current state of American strategic 
and ideological predominance yet, nevertheless, reiterated that America’s preeminence was due 
to the foreign policies and defense strategies pursued by President Reagan.  Americans, Kristol 
and Kagan argued, had never lived in a world “more conducive” to a “liberal international order” 
promoting the expansion of freedom and democracy, capitalism, and the security to freely travel 
and conduct business across the world.53 
A resurgent US foreign policy, Kagan and Kristol argued in their 1996 “Neo-Reaganite” 
article, had to preserve and enhance American predominance in the international arena.  This 
would include strengthening US security, supporting US allies, advancing US strategic interests, 
and never flinching from the advancement of American principles around the world.  The goal of 
American foreign policy, Kagan and Kristol claimed, was to “preserve that hegemony as far into 
the future as possible.”  The US was in need of a neo-Reaganite foreign policy atop the pillars of 
“military supremacy and moral confidence.”  The co-authors wanted a stingy Washington, D.C. 
to increase its present $260 billion/year defense budget by an additional sixty to eighty billion 
dollars.  To put it another way, at least twenty-three percent of the federal budget, the amount 
spent on foreign defense in 1978 prior to the Carter-Reagan buildup, would be required to pursue 
a neo-Reaganite foreign policy at the time of Kristol and Kagan’s 1996 article. 54 
“Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy” was a wake-up call for Americans to secure 
their country’s foreign interests with an invigorated resurgence.  The United States, Kagan and 
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Kristol argued, had achieved its present position in the world by “actively promoting American 
principles of governance abroad.”  Without a broad, sustaining foreign policy, Americans would 
be inclined to withdraw from world affairs and succumb to a disinterest in “vigorous” global 
leadership.  Kagan and Kristol pointed to history having shown that Americans have risen to the 
challenges of global leadership if their political representatives had made a convincing and 
persistent case for taking action.  Victory for American conservatives rested on recapturing 
former President Reagan’s active foreign policy.  Furthermore, Kagan and Kristol asserted that 
conservatism would come undone without a concerted understanding of America’s interests.  
Kristol and Kagan summed up their aspirations of unilateral pre-emptive strikes with a construed 
question along the lines of “Why not go out and search for monsters to destroy?”  To them, the 
alternative would be to let monsters reign freely while Americans idly stood by and watched.  To 
conclude their article, Kagan and Kristol reinforced the notion that a neo-Reaganite foreign 
policy would be good for conservatives, for America, and, most importantly, good for the 
world.55                                
Neoconservatives viewed the American “quest for freedom” as a pervading issue 
throughout American history.56  From a domestic angle, the neoconservative approach to foreign 
policy revealed America’s moral condition as showcasing a “benevolent empire.”  Kagan, 
himself, was a firm believer in the notion that the world benefitted from the United States.  In 
order to progress the preservation of America’s unique standing in the world, neoconservatives 
such as Kristol and Kagan argued that the US should feel free to act unilaterally.  This meant 
engaging American military resources, flexing American political will and, if necessary, 
abandoning treaties that might constrain American influence while simultaneously emboldening 
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hostile powers to cheat their way out of treaties set forth by international law bodies such as the 
United Nations.57  To reduce the possibility of these negative scenarios from coinciding, 
neoconservatives such as Kristol and Kagan argued for an increase in the US defense budget 
spending. 
The Wolfowitz-Khalilzad Op-Ed that Stressed the Iraq Threat 
In November 1997 Paul Wolfowitz, then serving as Professor of International Relations 
and Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns 
Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., and Zalmay Khalilzad, then serving as the Director of 
the Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Structure at the RAND Corporation, collaborated on an op-ed 
piece for The Washington Post entitled “We Must Lead the Way in Deposing Saddam.”  In the 
op-ed, Wolfowitz and Khalilzad encouraged the US to consider a “comprehensive new strategy” 
in the goal of achieving a “regime change” in Iraq that would then allow the country to “rejoin 
the family of nations” in reference to the United Nations. The co-authors highlighted Saddam’s 
“stubborn defiance of U.N. inspectors” along with his “attachment to his WMDs.” Wolfowitz 
and Khalilzad, both members of the PNAC, stressed the continued threat Iraq posed to the 
security and stability of a strategically pivotal part of the world, the Middle East.58 
Wolfowitz and Khalilzad wrote that the Clinton Administration claimed to have “all 
options” open yet that agenda only entailed “impotent U.N. resolutions” to “limited military 
strikes” with the continued enforcement of US-monitored no-fly zones placed over northern and 
southern Iraq.  Both worried that allies were viewing US policy toward Iraq as being stagnant 
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and without leadership.  Wolfowitz and Khalilzad had once been graduate students of the 
renowned University of Chicago political philosopher Leo Strauss who had impressed upon his 
students the “moral duty to oppose a leader who is a ‘tyrant.’”59  After Operation Desert Storm 
Wolfowitz, in particular, became an ardent believer in preemption in the quest to eliminate 
international tyrants before they could export their nefarious agendas abroad.  The co-authors 
worried that Saddam was growing more formidable while the fledgling Iraqi opposition 
contesting Hussein’s power was weakening.  Military action on the part of the US, Wolfowitz 
and Khalilzad stressed, would only be one component of a much broader strategy in removing 
Saddam from power.60   
The main agent of decisive change would come from inside the country via the 
opposition forces and from a US-backed Iraqi government in exile, the Iraqi National Congress, 
led by Iraqi defector, Ahmed Chalabi.  A sequence of events dovetailing in the transformation of 
Iraq would include the delegitimisation of Saddam’s rule, his subsequent indictment as a “war 
criminal,” as well as Iraq’s oil wealth being developed by companies working in partnership with 
the government of a free Iraq.  With an emphasis on close coordination with regional allies, 
namely Turkey, Wolfowitz and Khalilzad reiterated that Iraq’s continued noncompliance with 
UN weapons inspections should compel the US to take a “strong and sustained but 
discriminatory military action.”  It would take nothing but a “comprehensive strategy,” reasoned 
Wolfowitz and Khalilzad, to “restore our [US] credibility with the Iraqi people.”61             
The Letter to President Clinton 
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On January 26, 1998, the Project for the New American Century followed up the 
Wolfowitz-Khalilzad op-ed with a letter to President Clinton, calling for the president’s support 
of another war with Iraq.  The letter denounced Saddam Hussein as a threat to US Middle 
Eastern security and United Nations’ weapons inspectors. The purpose of the letter was to 
expose to President Clinton the dangers posed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq to the 
international community.  The issue at hand in this document, the foundation to the Bush 
Administration’s later allegations, was the argument that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction.  The document revealed a lack of confidence on the part of the Project for the New 
American Century in trusting neighboring Persian Gulf states to make certain Hussein continued 
to uphold sanctions or abide with UN weapons inspectors.  In the letter, the principals of the 
Project for the New American Century asserted that President Clinton had failed to monitor 
Iraq’s noncooperation with UN weapons inspectors and UN regulations.  Military action would 
be required to secure, in part, “a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil.”62 
 This document conveyed a shrill tone of urgency, emphasizing that a lack of action on 
the part of the president was unacceptable.  The phrase “we urge you” appeared numerous times 
throughout the document along with such words as “convinced” and “magnitude.”63  These 
words implied severity and an attention to proper recourse on the part of President Clinton.  The 
document made fervent recommendations and hyped a doomsday scenario if no forceful action 
was taken. 
 The signatories of this document carried a large amount of weight in Washington, D.C. 
policy circles.  John Bolton, Elliott Abrams, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard 
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Armitage, Paula Dobrianksy, Zalmay Khalilzad, Jeffrey Bergner, Robert B. Zoellick, William 
Schneider, Jr., and Peter W. Rodman all became members of President George W. Bush’s 
administration.  All of them were also members of the Project for the New American Century.  
Other signatories of the document included Richard Perle, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, 
George Mason University political scientist Francis Fukuyama, former CIA Director R. James 
Woolsey, Vin Weber, and William J. Bennett, who were also members of the PNAC.  The 
political beliefs of all the signatories of the letter were rooted in neo-conservatism demanding an 
increased American military presence in the 21st century. 
In the 1998 letter to President Clinton, the demand for a declaration of war placed by the 
Project for the New American Century was explicit with such phrases as “we urge you to seize 
that opportunity” and “the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be 
determined largely by how we handle this threat.”64  With no explicitly stated, verifiable sources 
supporting Saddam Hussein’s alleged lack of transparency with chemical and nuclear weapons 
inspections, the drafters of this document aimed to create an undeniable argument for unleashing 
war with sought-after approval from the executive branch. 
This letter presented answers to historical questions that have perplexed the American 
public since the country’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Firstly, the issue of removing Hussein from 
power rested upon the actions deemed appropriate by the American military to unilaterally 
remove the threat posed by Hussein.  Telling phrases such as, “it means removing Saddam 
Hussein and his regime from power” and “That now needs to become the aim of American 
foreign policy,” were especially expressive of the mindset of the framers of this document.  They 
wished to put President Clinton in a need for war with the minimization of any possible friction 
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occurring when proposing such a war in the United Nations General Assembly.  Secondly, the 
phrase, “a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard,” reinforced the 
geopolitical importance embodied by Iraq that the US was prepared to defend in the Mid-East 
region.  Thirdly, the ultimatum at the end of the document was nonbinding and a test of a 
president’s resolve and conviction:  either go to war or risk putting American foreign interests in 
peril.65 
The Clinton Speech on Iraq 
The PNAC letter to Clinton spurred the president to issue a statement regarding the threat 
Saddam Hussein posed to Iraqis, Middle Eastern stability, and international security.  On 
February 17, 1998, President Clinton addressed Saddam’s long, checkered history of using 
chemical and biological weapons in times of war with emphasis on the eight year Iran-Iraq War 
of the 1980s.  Clinton also mentioned Hussein’s barbaric style of quelling civil disturbances as in 
the 1988 Halabja, Iraqi Kurdistan, sarin gas attack upon a segment of the Iraqi Kurdish 
population.  Clinton highlighted how Iraq had revised its nuclear declarations four times within a 
span of fourteen months and how six different biological warfare declarations had all been 
rejected by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).66 
In his address before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon officials, President Clinton 
revealed how Hussein Kamal, Saddam’s son-in-law and also chief organizer of Iraq’s weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) program, revealed in 1995 Iraq’s continuing weapons program and 
Saddam Hussein’s desire to increase its weapons capacity.  Kamal claimed that Iraq had 
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admitted to possessing 5,000 gallons of botulinum; 2,000 gallons of anthrax; 25 Scud warheads 
filled with biological agents; and 157 aerial bombs in its arsenal.  To date, UNSCOM had 
destroyed 40,000 chemical weapons; 100,000 gallons of chemical weapons agents; 48 
operational missiles; 30 warheads fitted for chemical and biological weapons (CBW); and a 
facility that had been equipped for manufacturing anthrax at Al Hakam.  While UNSCOM still 
believed Iraq had more weapons grade materials that it was not disclosing, Clinton reiterated that 
the UN inspection system had already proved its effectiveness.  Furthermore, Clinton stressed, a 
diplomatic solution to Iraq’s obfuscation of its weapons programs hinged upon the outcome laid 
forth by clear, immutable, and reasonable standards imposed by UNSCOM.  Iraq had to agree to 
deliver free and unfettered access to facilities anywhere in the country as stipulated by the United 
Nations Security Council.67 
President Clinton concluded his speech with the same ominous foreboding also present in 
the letter the PNAC had submitted to him one month earlier.  “And some day, some way, I 
guarantee you, he’ll use the arsenal,” stated Clinton, that would force the UN to amass a 
coalition of nations against Iraq in a military show of force.  Clinton made clear that the US 
wanted to “seriously” diminish Iraq’s WMD program and its capacity to harm its Middle Eastern 
neighbors.  A military operation, Clinton asserted, would not destroy all Iraq’s WMD stockpiles 
but would significantly weaken Saddam’s abilities to engage with his WMD.  What would not 
change, Clinton promised, was the continued reinforcement of the no-fly zones imposed over 
northern and southern Iraq.  The threat posed by Saddam Hussein required unwavering vigilance 
on the part of the US and the UN, Clinton concluded.  Clinton closed his speech with the precise 
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sentiment the PNAC was hoping he would express.  Failing to respond to Iraq today, Clinton 
warned in closing, would only embolden Saddam tomorrow.68 
On February 19, 1998, two days after the Clinton speech, most of the eighteen PNAC 
signatories of the January letter to President Clinton, along with two dozen other State and 
Defense Department officials, submitted another open letter to the president.  The letter, 
sponsored by a bipartisan group called the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf co-
chaired by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, repeated the call for ‘“a 
determined program to change the regime in Baghdad.”’69  Throughout the letter, urgency and 
excessive hyperbole exclaimed that “Saddam is more wily, brutal and conspiratorial than any 
likely conspiracy the United States might mobilize against him. Saddam must be 
overpowered…he rules by terror…makes him hated by his own people and the rank and file of 
his military. Iraq today is ripe for a broad-based insurrection.”70              
Repositioning American Hegemony for the 21st Century 
“Rebuilding America’s Defenses” was a report issued “solely” by the Project for the New 
Century dated September 2000.71  This was a document intended to be made public, written by a 
public policy group to influence public opinion.  The “project participants” on the last page of 
the published document were labeled as contributors if they had attended “at least one project 
meeting or contributed a paper for discussion.”72  The institutions represented by the contributing 
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members of the document are magnets of power, influence, and prestige including the U.S. 
Naval War College, the Project for the New American Century, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Ivy League universities including 
Harvard and Yale. 
The purpose of “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” was clear from its outset:  preserving, 
while bolstering, the military and strategic superiority exuded by the United States heading into 
the 21st Century.  In addition, this document conveyed a mindfulness that the 21st Century would 
require the United States to reexamine and retune its defining role as the lone superpower in the 
sphere of world politics.  The introduction of the document revealed the intents and purposes that 
guided the Project for the New American Century while simultaneously laying out the approach 
the think tank took in the analysis present in the document.  From examining the introduction, 
two glaring motives for constructing the document jumped out:  the Pentagon’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review (May 1997) and the report of the National Defense Panel (December 1997) with 
also preserving the United States’ strategic position of military preeminence across the globe 
both today and in the future.73  This report, the document claimed, was the culmination of ten 
years’ worth of researching and fashioning a defense strategy serving to address the threats to 
peace and stability in the environment of global security.74 
The language of the text in the document was hardline, persuasive, and urgent.  This 
document called for an escalation of military strategies to ensure American global dominance in 
addressing and tackling ever-evolving threats.  Phrases brimming with military jargon abounded 
in the document such as “deterrent capability,” “American security perimeter,” “no-fly-zone 
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operations,” and “American geopolitical preeminence.”75  In the context of advocating for a 
second ground assault on Iraq and perhaps ensuring a reinforced US presence in the Middle East, 
a quote on page twenty-two of the report proclaimed, “a permanent unit should be based in the 
Persian Gulf region.”76 
Bush’s 9/11 
The early first term of the George W. Bush Administration was dominated by 
realpolitik.77  Prior to 9/11, the US began mobilizing “all available resources” to overthrow 
Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, but did not include plans for an actual invasion.78  President 
Bush, espousing his brand of realpolitik, was quoted at the first meeting of the National Security 
Council on January 30, 2001, as saying, “Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really 
clarify things.”79  At the meeting, President Bush asked, “What’s on the agenda?”’ to which 
Condoleezza Rice replied, ‘“How Iraq is destabilizing the region, Mr. President.”’80  Treasury 
Secretary Paul O’Neill, serving under George W. Bush from 2001 till 2002, walked away from 
that first principals committee meeting, summing up the collective opinion arrived at by the 
administration as, “Getting Hussein was now the administration focus.”81  The ensuing February 
7, 2001, Principals Committee meeting focused squarely on Iraq.82     
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Every member of Bush’s inner circle was given an assignment related to Iraq at the close 
of the January 30, 2001, Principals Committee meeting.  Colin Powell was to draw up new 
sanctions on Iraq, CIA Director George Tenet was to improve intelligence on Iraq, Paul O’Neill 
was to investigate how to financially destabilize the Iraqi regime, and Donald Rumsfeld was 
tasked with reexamining military options concerning Iraq.83  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
viewed Iraq as a reason to transform the American military.84  9/11 was the catalyst that 
transformed President George W. Bush into a neoconservative president.85  He became the 
president the PNAC had always dreamed of. 
The war on terrorism launched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks embodied the flourishing 
neoconservative “Bush Doctrine.”  This doctrine rested upon a preemptive American military 
presence in the Middle East to promote democracy and the freedom and peace that came along 
with it.86  Specifically, a regime change in Iraq would serve as a dramatic example of American-
branded freedom.87  If necessary, America would act alone in this enterprising endeavor 
conscious of world opinion but not restrained by possible inaction on the part of the international 
community.  The United States, President Bush proclaimed in “starkly moralistic terms” on 
September 12, 2001, was bracing for ‘“a monumental struggle between good and evil.”’88  The 
Bush Doctrine also meant that the restraints and limitations the intelligence community was 
obligated to adhere to prior 9/11 had come off, granting the CIA broader authorization and a 
wider array of resources to fight the war on terrorism.89  The Bush Doctrine, carefully sculpted 
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and cultivated by the neoconservative architects running the Project for the New American 
Century, applied only to the Middle East with Iraq representing a suitable pretext for the 
promotion of American democracy and freedom with the larger goal of its implementation across 
the entire Middle East.90 
Connecting Dots in the Aftermath of 9/11 
Between President Bush’s inauguration day of January 20, 2001, and September 11, 
2001, the administration had received “44 morning intelligence reports from the CIA mentioning 
the al-Qaeda threat,” and not once did Bush’s team take action to thwart the prospect of an 
attack, according to CIA Director George Tenet, who headed the intelligence agency during 
9/11.91  These intelligence reports are collectively known as the “President’s Daily Brief (PDB),” 
consisting of “a series of six to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering a broad array of 
topics” chosen at the discretion of the CIA pertaining to subjects the intelligence agency 
considers “the most important on any given day.”92  A section in the August 6, 2001, PDB 
entitled ‘“Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,’” termed by President Bush as being “historical 
in nature,” alerted the president that “al Qaeda was dangerous” with an additional portentousness 
that “the threat of a Bin Laden attack in the United States remained both current and serious.”93  
On September 10, 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted two emails from a 
suspected al-Qaeda location in Afghanistan that went untranslated for another two days.  The 
emails respectively read as ‘“The Match begins tomorrow”’ and ‘“Tomorrow is zero hour.’”94   
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On that very next day, a crystal blue early autumn morning, Mohammed Atta and four 
other hijackers boarded American Airlines Flight 11 in Boston bound for Los Angeles scheduled 
to depart at 7:45 AM.95  Also present at Boston Logan International Airport was another group of 
five hijackers, led by Marwan al Shehhi, who boarded United Flight 175 bound for Los Angeles 
with a scheduled departure time of 8:00 AM.96  A third group of hijackers, led by al-Qaeda 
operative Ziad Jarrah, departed from Newark International Airport in New Jersey on United 
Flight 93 bound for LA at 8:00 AM.97  At the same time farther south, a fourth group of five 
hijackers led by Hani Hanjour boarded American Airlines Flight 77 at Washington Dulles 
International Airport bound for LA.  By 8 AM, nineteen men affiliated with al-Qaeda had 
boarded four cross-country flights.  Their actions would irreversibly change the trajectory of 
future American international relations and the strategic placement of US military emphasis.98  
On September 11, 2001, America’s War on Terror was ignited by hijacked airliners crashing into 
the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., 
and, by accident, an abandoned strip mine near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  Thousands of 
innocent civilians went to their deaths in the worst attack on American soil since the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor.                          
Five hours after American Airlines Flight 77 had crashed into the Pentagon on September 
11, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called for retaliatory strikes on Iraq.  Aides who had 
worked alongside Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center on September 11 later 
corroborated this instinctive reaction.  On 9/11, hours after the attacks had occurred on New 
York City and the Pentagon, the NSA intercepted a phone call from an Osama bin Laden 
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operative in Afghanistan to a number traced to the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, warning 
of more attacks to come on the United States.  Upon learning of that intercepted telephone call, 
Rumsfeld ordered strike planning.  Concerning the issue of Saddam Hussein possibly having 
played a leading role in the 9/11 attacks, Rumsfeld was quoted in a memo instructing General 
Richard Myers, the acting United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on 9/11, to 
amass the ‘“best info fast. Judge whether good enough to hit S.H.”’ and bin Laden ‘“at same 
time…”’99  Notes also revealed Rumsfeld adding, ‘“Go massive,”’ and ‘“Sweep it all up.  Things 
related and not.”’100  The events of 9/11 spurred the formation of a group of top advisors whom 
President Bush later referred to as his “war council.”101  This group “usually included” Vice 
President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, CIA Director 
Tenet, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Myers, Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton, FBI Director Robert Mueller, 
National Security Advisor Rice, and Chief of Staff Andrew Card.102  One of the assignments for 
this upper echelon group of advisors, as urged by Secretary Rumsfeld, was to “think broadly 
about who might have harbored the attackers [of 9/11], including Iraq…”103      
Iraq had been a hot topic of conversation and an issue of fluid deliberation both inside the 
Bush Administration and within the PNAC before 9/11.  On 9/11, and in the days immediately 
following the terrorist attacks, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was quoted as 
remarking to Sir Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to the US, on the day of the attacks: 
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“We are just looking to see whether there could possibly be a connection with Saddam Hussein.”  
On the evening of 9/11, Donald Rumsfeld was quoted as saying “You know, we’ve got to do 
Iraq—there just aren’t enough targets in Afghanistan.”  Richard Clarke, the National Security 
Council counterterrorism advisor, tepidly expressed on September 12, 2001: “Having been 
attacked by al Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading 
Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.”104   
On September 12, President Bush observed to his cabinet and the intelligence 
community: “Look, I know you have a lot to do and all...but I want you, as soon as you can, to 
go back over everything, everything.  See if Saddam did this.  See if he’s linked in any 
way…Look into Iraq, Saddam.”105  Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, while not directly 
implicating Iraq in the 9/11 attacks yet obscurely implying through a filter of jingoism that Iraq, 
too, served as a bastion of terrorism that must ultimately be neutralized, observed on September 
13, 2001: “I think one has to say it’s not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding 
them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states 
who sponsor terrorism.”106  In the days immediately following 9/11, Secretary of State Powell 
noticed how fervent Wolfowitz was in pursing possible Iraqi ties to terrorism and 9/11.  Years 
later when testifying before the 9/11 Commission, Powell explained how ‘“Paul was always of 
the view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with.”’107  Meanwhile, Defense Department 
Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith, keeping in lockstep with Wolfowitz in the days 
following the terror attacks, stated his own target of interest to Lieutenant General Greg 
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Newbold (US Marine Corps), the Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the days 
following 9/11: “Why are you working on Afghanistan? You ought to be working on Iraq.”108   
By September 15, 2001, George W. Bush had decided whether or not he wanted to 
pursue Saddam: “We will get this guy but at a time and place of our choosing.”  An unnamed 
CIA analyst retorted a few days following 9/11 with this biting statement of there needing to be 
concrete evidence linking Hussein to 9/11 and not just kneejerk, unfounded American-led 
accusations: “If you want to go after that son of a bitch to settle old scores, be my guest. But 
don’t tell us he is connected to 9/11 or to terrorism because there is no evidence to support that. 
You will have to have a better reason.”  Finally, the PNAC issued this statement on September 
20, 2001, that even if Iraq was not directly tied to 9/11, the US should support an Iraqi 
opposition aimed at toppling a source of terrorism, namely Saddam Hussein:  
Even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at 
the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq …. The United States must therefore 
provide full military and financial support to the Iraqi opposition. American 
military force should be used to provide a ‘safe zone’ in Iraq from which the 
opposition can operate. And American forces must be prepared to back up our 
commitment to the Iraqi opposition by all necessary means.109 
 
The Letter to President Bush 
September 20, 2001, was also the day the PNAC submitted a letter to President Bush 
with one direct, yet overarching objective: “lead the world to victory” in the war against 
terrorism.  In the letter, the PNAC voiced agreement with the sentiment of Secretary of State 
Colin Powell in that the US “must find and punish the perpetrators” of 9/11, namely Saddam 
Hussein who Powell pointed to as being one of the “leading terrorists” in the world.  The PNAC 
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outlined a series of steps it deemed as “necessary parts of a comprehensive strategy” in carrying 
out the “first war of the 21st century.”  The PNAC was not concerned if evidence did not link 
Iraq to the events of 9/11.  Removing Hussein from power, the PNAC argued, would be a part of 
any strategy in eliminating global terrorism.110 
The PNAC September 2001 letter to President Bush delivered a striking message:  a 
failure to oust Saddam Hussein from power would be tantamount to an early surrender in the war 
on terrorism.  The PNAC encouraged the Bush Administration to pledge full military and 
monetary assistance to the Iraqi political opposition, while also establishing a “safe zone” for the 
Iraqi opposition to operate within.  American forces would provide assistance to the Iraqi 
opposition by “all necessary means” as stressed by the PNAC.  The letter to Bush was not 
confined to solely taking action upon Iraq.  The PNAC, through the letter, motivated the Bush 
Administration to expand its use of force in the region to Iran and Syria, both of whom, as 
emphasized by the PNAC, were “known state sponsors of terrorism.”  The PNAC, through its 
letter to the president, also strove to remind Bush of America’s commitment to rally behind our 
“staunchest” ally in the Middle East, Israel, in supporting the Jewish state to defund the 
Palestinian Authority of any further assistance until the organization combatted terrorism within 
its own borders of influence.  The PNAC wanted the Bush Administration to think and act 
globally in its fight against terrorism.111 
The PNAC concluded its September 2001 letter to President Bush with a reminder to the 
administration that fighting terrorism required the US to “remain capable of defending our 
[America’s] interests elsewhere in the world.”  Additionally, the PNAC stressed that there ought 
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to be “no hesitation” in funding the war on terror. The PNAC rationalized that all the steps 
outlined in its letter to Bush “constitute[d] the minimum necessary” in order to win the war on 
terror.  The purpose the PNAC upheld in writing its letter to Bush was to guarantee the think 
tank’s support and confidence in President Bush knowing “what must be done to lead the nation 
to victory in this fight.”112                              
The Threats Posed by Iraq 
In his memoir, Known and Unknown, Donald Rumsfeld argued that Iraq was the only 
nation in the world to attack the US military on a daily basis over internationally recognized “no 
fly” zones in the northern and southern portion of that country.113  There were more than two 
thousand recorded confrontations from January 2000 to September 2002 involving American and 
British aircraft having faced Iraqi fire from the ground.  In July 2001, Rumsfeld submitted a 
memo to Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice that presented two troubling scenarios if Iraqi aggression was not curtailed: a 
nuclear power-seeking Iran could trigger a possible region-wide arms buildup and the 
elimination of a Gulf state royal family could affect the Iraqi regime and, furthermore, the 
political balance of the Middle East.114  Rumsfeld on July 27, 2001, said that American influence 
in the Middle East would rise if Saddam Hussein were to be ousted: “If Saddam’s regime were 
ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region and elsewhere…A major success 
with Iraq would enhance U.S. credibility and influence throughout the region.”115   
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In dealing with Saddam, Rumsfeld presented a “range of possibilities for consideration.”  
These included ending President Clinton’s policy of containing Saddam, a “robust” policy of 
serious regime change among “moderate Arab friends,” and the third, less popular option of 
initiating direct contact with Saddam.  The possibility of the third option coming to fruition was 
slim and would have potentially resulted in American allies in the Middle East becoming 
disenchanted with American policy toward Iraq.116 
UN weapons sanctions against Iraq established in the 1990s after Iraq’s defeat in Desert 
Storm were clearly crumbling.117  Weapons violations as well as Iraq’s alleged links to terrorist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda were of mounting concern to the US.  The US also worried that Iraq’s 
sustained defiance of UN sanctions would further erode the credibility and resolve of the UN 
while also encouraging other regimes to follow Iraq’s lead.118  This led to President Bush’s 
doctrine of preemptive attack resting upon the notion of “anticipatory self-defense.”119  A 
preemptive action involves a willingness to commence a war only if the instigator thinks it is 
likely to face an attack or if it feels threatened by the prospect of attack.120  Douglas Feith 
presented a memo in 2002 entitled “Sovereignty and Anticipatory Self-Defense” that called for 
“an aggressive diplomatic effort coupled by a threat of military force” with the aim of 
convincing Saddam Hussein to seek exile or be forcibly removed by either the Iraqi army or the 
US.121 
In the winter of 2001-2002, the National Security Council drafted its annual National 
Security Strategy report, and Iraq was not mentioned once.  Despite this, connections were 
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drawn between Iraq and Al-Qaeda by the Bush Administration with added stress placed upon 
uncovering Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the possibility of such weapons 
falling into the hands of extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda.122  President Bush, in his January 
2002 State of the Union Address, uttered the phrase that would come to define much of his 
presidency: “Axis of Evil.”123  In fact, the countries comprising the Bush Administration’s “Axis 
of Evil” (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) were cited as early as 1998 in a speech delivered by 
Donald Rumsfeld before the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States.124 
In a January 2002 issue of The Weekly Standard, PNAC mainstays Robert Kagan and Bill 
Kristol co-wrote an article entitled “What to do About Iraq” that unequivocally stated that “any 
attack on Iraq must succeed quickly” with added stress placed on a long-term commitment on the 
part of the US to rebuild Iraq post-Saddam Hussein.125  A successful American invasion of Iraq, 
the pair argued, was “capable of reverberating around the Arab world.”126  Kagan and Kristol 
clamored for the US to finally recognize its role as “global leader” and to “use the events of 9/11 
as an igniter and reminder to never have that event reoccur.”127  To Kagan and Kristol, the US’s 
deliberation on whether to invade Iraq was a non-issue by January 2002.  The two fully expected 
President Bush to remove Saddam’s regime.  To make the matter more pressing, the pair warned 
through their article that the “clock is ticking in Iraq,” referring to the notion that with each 
passing day Saddam Hussein was closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon.128 
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What Kagan and Kristol meant by their ticking clock comment in their January 2002 
article was that no one in the international community disputed the “nature of the Iraq threat.”129  
German intelligence had predicted in December 2000 that Iraq possessed the capability of having 
three nuclear weapons by 2005.  Furthermore, Kagan and Kristol pointed to the speculation that 
Iraq had forty-one biological warfare agent (BWA) production sites scattered throughout the 
country.130  This was knowledge that had been brought to the attention of the international 
community as early as 1998.  The pair cited the Federation of American Scientists who warned 
that Iraq was capable of producing ‘“350 liters of weapons-grade anthrax”’ a week.131  Kagan 
and Kristol struck hard with a question and an accompanying answer to reinforce the message of 
their article.  In a post-9/11 world, Kagan and Kristol wondered what if Saddam provided 
anthrax or VX gas or a nuclear warhead to a group such as al-Qaeda.  In turn, the pair reminded 
their audience that “we do know” that Saddam is an ally to terrorists, that it is inconceivable to 
imagine a world in which Saddam possessed WMDs, and that the US would prefer to act in 
cooperation with the international community in defeating Saddam.132  Nevertheless, the US 
would be willing to attack unilaterally if necessary.                                   
In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush pointed to Iraq as “a regime that 
has something to hide from the civilized world.”133  Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech was heavily 
laden with neoconservative ideology including this telling view of America’s global 
responsibility:  “History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our 
responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.”134  Vice President Richard Cheney 
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presented the nightmare scenario with pressing urgency of WMDs falling into the hands of 
terrorists:  “If you wait for intelligence to drive policy, you will have waited too long.”135  The 
Bush Administration regarded WMDs as a grave and growing danger.  Preventing rogue states 
such as Iraq from making and acquiring WMDs became a major focus of the administration.136 
Clearly, the White House was not waiting on the intelligence community to present its findings 
on Iraq. 
The burgeoning Bush Doctrine advocating preemption and unilateral American resolve to 
rid the world of the evils of terrorism was on full display.  President Bush elevated the tone and 
urgency of the doctrine when he delivered the commencement address to graduates at the US 
Military Academy at West Point in June 2002.  The president specifically called upon the 
graduates to answer the call of history to fight a war on terror that had only begun with the 
president’s assurance that US military victories outside of the successful campaign in 
Afghanistan were due to follow.  President Bush repeated his 2002 State of the Union Address 
that Americans carried with them the “opportunity” and “duty” to lead the rest of the civilized 
world in spreading a “just peace” across the world by eviscerating threats from both terrorists 
and tyrants abroad.137  However in a calculated, subsequent statement designed to silence critics 
wary of a potentially protracted conflict, Bush made clear that American commitment to 
eradicate terrorism did not carry with it a desire to spread an American “empire” or propagate an 
American-centric “utopia.”138  Bush warned that if “chemical and biological and nuclear 
weapons” fell into the wrong hands “even weak states and small groups could attain a 
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catastrophic power to strike great nations.”139  America, the president declared in moral terms, 
was locked in a “conflict between good and evil” requiring a “firm moral purpose” in “opposing 
[and] confronting evil and lawless regimes.”140  Bush left the West Point graduates with this 
revealing view of 21st Century America’s duty to follow the neoconservative-laden Bush 
Doctrine:  “we must take the battle to the enemy.”141  The Bush Administration was inching 
towards war with Iraq. 
 America: The Sheriff-Europe: The Hall Monitor 
In his widely-read 2002 article, “Power and Weakness,” Robert Kagan wrote of a Europe 
suspended in a “Kantian paradise of perpetual peace” with the US consciously and purposely 
taking on global security issues unilaterally.142  Years before the crystallization of foreign policy 
rigidity defining the relationship between the United States under President George W. Bush and 
European allies, the Clinton Administration had grown distressed and impatient with “European 
timidity” in Europe’s unwillingness to confront Saddam Hussein alongside the United States.143  
The split in the European/American alliance, Kagan claimed, came in 1997 when the US was at 
odds with France and Great Britain in the United Nations Security Council over how to respond 
to the growing threat the US perceived Saddam Hussein to be.144  Kagan argued that Americans 
were more militarily formidable than their European counterparts and, as a result, less tolerant of 
Saddam and the threat he posed with his alleged weapons of mass destruction.145 
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“Power and Weakness” was a well-constructed argument at a low point in European-
American diplomatic relations over how to address the threat of Saddam Hussein.  Kagan crafted 
the argument of America, not Europe, knowing what was best to ensure the safety of the Western 
world through unilateral American might, not through a transatlantic coalition defined by 
political bargaining and foreign policy impotence.  America, Kagan asserted, was the world’s 
lonely behemoth that historically, unlike Europe, did not have to justify its actions by raison 
d’état.146  The guarantee of American security enjoyed by Europe was a “disparity” in 
psychology and power between the two, Kagan noted.147 
Iraq posed a different threat level to the US than to Europe, Robert Kagan wrote in his 
2002 article, “Power and Weakness.”148  At the time of this article’s publication in the summer of 
2002, over seventy percent of the American public believed the US could successfully invade 
Iraq, topple Saddam Hussein, and secure Iraq.149  Kagan proclaimed the US had to act as the 
“international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some 
peace and justice” in a world Americans viewed as lawless, overrun by outlaws that needed to be 
“deterred or destroyed.”150  Expounding upon this sentiment, Kagan admitted that Europe was 
still dependent upon American willingness to employ force to deter or defeat those in the world 
while still espousing to the belief of “power politics.”151 
When dealing with rogue states, Robert Kagan in “Power and Weakness” quoted British 
diplomat and advisor Robert Cooper as saying, “we need to revert to the rougher methods of an 
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earlier era of force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary.”152  The US had created 
a post-World War II paradise for Europe but could not enjoy its splendors alongside the 
Europeans because America was the world’s watchdog, remaining “stuck in history” of 
defending itself in the “dangerous, Hobbesian world” existing outside Europe.153  Speaking for 
all of America, Kagan resoundingly asserted that in a post-9/11 world Americans appeared 
willing to bear the burden of overseeing global security for a “long time to come.”154  Kagan also 
spoke for the entirety of America when he admitted that “Americans are idealists.”155  However, 
in Kagan’s opinion, they are inexperienced in the promotion of their ideals in a successful way 
without exerting power.  As time goes along, Kagan concluded, the United States would become 
“less inclined to listen” or even “care” what Europe thinks of its military actions.156                                      
In the 1990s, neoconservatives ignored the threat posed by terrorism.157  The four 
priorities emphasizing American national interests at the dawning of the new millennium 
included the deterrence and disarming of rogue states, the containment of a rising China, 
renewed vigilance over Russia, and the maintenance of international order.158  The events of 
September 11, 2001, bolstered two arguments neoconservatives had long posed:  America had 
not been displaying a sufficient show of force over the preceding two decades, and 9/11 had 
undoubtedly marked the commencement of the “4th World War” with the Cold War having been 
the third world war neocons had argued.159  The events of 9/11 ignited the American global war 
against “militant Islam.”160  Neoconservative groups such as the PNAC viewed the scourge of 
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terrorism as a consequence from a lack of democracy in the Middle East rather than as a result of 
the region’s economic underdevelopment.  Paul Wolfowitz went so far as to say that states like 
Iraq should be “ended.”161     
October 2002: A Hive of Freneticism in D.C. 
On October 9, 2002, The International New York Times published the transcript of a letter 
exchanged between Senator Bob Graham (Florida-D), serving as Chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, and CIA Director George Tenet.  The letter detailed decisions to 
declassify materials sensitive to the Iraq WMD investigation.  An unfettered US-led attack, the 
letter argued, would reduce the probability of Saddam Hussein using chemical and biological 
weapons (CBW) against the US, either by his own accord or with the help of a terrorist group.  
In its story, the newspaper also featured a declassified dialogue between Senator Carl Levin 
(Michigan-D) and an unnamed senior intelligence witness that had taken place on October 2, 
2002.  Levin asked if Saddam Hussein would initiate a WMD attack to which the intelligence 
witness replied that the probability was low.  Levin followed up asking what the “likelihood” 
was that Hussein would respond to a US attack with CBW to which the witness simply replied 
“pretty high.”162 
The International New York Times article from early October 2002, in addition, 
highlighted unclassified discussions related to Senator Evan Bayh’s (Indiana-D) line of 
questioning related to Iraqi links to Al Qaeda that senators could have drawn upon.  These 
included sources of “varying reliability” in examining the relationship between Iraq and Al- 
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Qaeda as provided by detainees, “solid reporting” over the course of a decade conducted by 
senior level contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, and “credible information” of Iraq and Al- 
Qaeda discussing a “safe haven.”  Since Operation Enduring Freedom had begun in October 
2001, declassified discussions had shown “solid evidence” of an Al-Qaeda presence in Iraq and 
“credible reporting” that leaders of Al-Qaeda had sought Iraqi contacts in acquiring WMD 
capabilities.  As a lasting point deemed suitable for a declassified discussion detailing Iraq’s 
links to extremist Palestinian groups as well as a strengthening relationship with Al-Qaeda, the 
newspaper article concluded by “suggest[ing]” that Baghdad’s links to terrorism would continue 
to increase.163                   
In the fall of 2002, The Weekly Standard accelerated and sharpened its critique of US 
intelligence agencies and their gathering of evidence to mount the argument to go to war with 
Iraq.  A bitingly urgent piece came from a Middle Eastern political analyst writing for the 
political magazine, Reuel Marc Gerecht, entitled “A Necessary War” published in the October 
2002 issue.  Gerecht opined that a war against Iraq would reinforce, not weaken, “whatever” 
collective spirit existed amongst intelligence agencies working against Islamic radicals.  Gerecht 
wrote of “self-interest” and a “fear of American power” binding together any lasting 
international efforts against terrorism.  American intelligence agencies sharing evidence with one 
another in mutual cooperation would make the European community more confident in accepting 
the evidence presented by the US before the UN, Gerecht wrote.  The future success of 
countervailing international terrorism depended upon the American and European intelligence 
communities working alongside one another, Gerecht noted.  The least desirable scenario for all 
transatlantic allies, Gerecht concluded in his piece, would be a reversion back to a pre-9/11 status 
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quo, and that meant not going to war with Iraq.164  While Kagan was dismissing the United 
States’ European allies for their weakness, Gerecht was advocating continued close cooperation.   
US Intelligence: Making the Case for War Against Iraq 
Over in Langley, Virginia, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under Director George 
Tenet released a multi-page document detailing the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s current 
weapons of mass destruction programs in October 2002.  The document revealed the 
continuation of Iraq’s WMD programs “in defiance” of UN rules and regulations of chemical 
and biological weapons.  If left unchecked, Hussein’s programs could culminate in Iraq 
acquiring enough “weapons-grade fissile material” to produce a nuclear weapon by the end of 
the decade.165  In particular, the CIA highlighted that “high-strength aluminum tubes are of 
significant concern,” and speculated that these tubes contained lethal agents including “mustard, 
sarin, cyclosarin, VX.”166  The document stressed that all aspects of Iraq’s offensive biological 
weapons program were active, large-scale, mobile, equipped to evade detection, highly 
“survivable,” and thought to exceed the production rates prior to the Gulf War that lasted from 
August 1990 until February 1991.167 
The discussion swirling around the CIA in the fall of 2002 as presented by its October 
2002 document revolved around Iraq’s “determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its 
WMD arsenal.”  Some analysts within the CIA were uncomfortable with not being capable to 
provide “credible proof it [Iraq] has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production 
                                                          
164 Reuel Marc Gerecht, “A Necessary War,” in The Weekly Standard, 21 Oct. 2002 
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/768lyuyh.asp> (13 Aug. 2015).  
165 Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” in cia.gov, 1 Oct. 2002 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm> (25 July 2015). 
166 Ibid, 4. 
167 Ibid. 
42 
 
infrastructure.”168  The agency demonstrated through “substantial evidence” as provided by the 
“UN Security Council Resolutions and Provisions for Inspections and Monitoring Theory and 
Practice” that Iraq was “reconstituting prohibited programs” demonstrating the country’s 
“extensive efforts…to deny information” pertaining to its weapons programs since the end of the 
Gulf War.169  The CIA document also warned that UN sanctions had proven inconsequential in 
the interest of Saddam Hussein acquiring “tubes” to be used in a “variety of uranium enrichment 
techniques.”170   
Iraq was known to have used chemical weapons against both the Iranian military during 
the Iran/Iraq War stretching from 1980 to 1988 and against the marginalized Iraqi Kurdish 
population in the Halabja gas attack of 1988.171  UNSCOM weapons inspections following Gulf 
War I revealed that Iraq’s nuclear program had been significantly downgraded, however the 
intelligence community remained unsure on the level of advancement of Iraq’s biological and 
chemical weapons programs.172  Of the fifteen million kilograms of chlorine imported under the 
Oil-for-Food program since 1997, Iraq was shown to have used ten million kilograms suggesting 
that some 5 million kilograms were diverted to proscribed activities such as chemical weapons 
production.173  In 1995, the CIA document revealed, the Iraqis had finally admitted to producing 
and weaponizing biological agents.174  Throughout its document, the CIA reiterated the 
“compelling reasons to be concerned of BW [biological weapons] activity” concluding that 
Iraq’s perceived ballistic missile program was “never fully accounted for” whose capabilities 
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exceeded the limitations established under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 
believed by most analysts to be “intended for delivering warfare agents.”175 
Concurrently as the CIA was presenting its findings and analysis on Iraq’s WMD 
programs, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) presented its National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE).  These classified documents related to Iraq’s continuing programs for WMDs and were 
intended for policymakers on Capitol Hill in October 2002.  NIEs give senior policymakers a 
consensus of the American intelligence community on a given subject while portraying “honestly 
dissenting and alternative views.”176  The documents were approved for publication by the 
formerly named National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the Director of 
Central Intelligence, George Tenet.177  The NIE was purposed to answer two key questions on 
nuclear weapons as they related to Iraq: 1) Did Saddam have them? 2) If not, when could he 
acquire them?178  Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear 
Programs, oversaw the documents’ preparation.179  The documents pertained to the NIC pointing 
to Baghdad as having mobile facilities equipped for manufacturing bacterial and toxin biological 
weapons (BW) agents capable of evading detection and being highly survivable.180  The 
document, in turn, speculated that within three to six months the active and highly advanced 
mobile units could produce the amount of agent equal to the total amount that Iraq had produced 
in all the years of the program leading up to the Gulf War.181 
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The NIC judged the Iraqi WMD program as being in continual defiance of UN weapons 
rules and regulations.182  Despite the “lack [of] specific information on many key aspects of the 
Iraq WMD programs,” the NIC observed that Baghdad was “reconstituting [its] nuclear weapons 
programs” funded, in part, by the sale of Iraq’s soaring illicit oil production.183  The document 
reported that Saddam did not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material for manufacturing 
nuclear weapons, yet he remained “intent” on acquiring them.184  Without the sufficient amount 
or grade of foreign material instrumental in a nuclear weapon’s manufacture, the NIC declared 
that Iraq would not attain a nuclear grade weapon until 2007 to 2009.185  In addition to 
aspirations for nuclear devices, the NIC warned that Iraq had been renewing its production of 
mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX nerve gas.186 
Despite their warnings of the growing threat Saddam posed with his WMD programs, the 
NIC truthfully admitted to a “low confidence” in their ability to assess when Iraq would use its 
WMD stockpiles.187  Conjecture marked by such keywords as “probably,” “believes,” and 
“could” appeared repeatedly throughout the 2002 classified documents including such passages 
as Iraq “probably” attempting to launch clandestine attacks against the US, if Baghdad feared of 
an imminent attack, or a reprisal attack in the aftermath of an actual US-led attack.188  Saddam 
“could” use Al-Qaeda to launch terrorist attacks in a “life-or-death struggle” against the US.  
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford believed that Saddam 
continued to actively seek acquiring nuclear weapons.  However, many of Iraq’s activities as 
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monitored by US intelligence bodies revealed no “compelling case” existed that Iraq was, 
indeed, acquiring nuclear weapons.189  The set of classified documents, nonetheless, displayed a 
“high confidence” that Iraq was continuing to expand its chemical, biological, nuclear, and 
missile programs and a “low confidence” pertaining to when or if Saddam would attack the US 
homeland, himself, or if he would employ a rogue, asymmetric outfit such as Al-Qaeda to strike 
for him.190  At one particular moment characterized by clarity Bob Walpole, managing the NIE, 
after having been given the coordinating assignment candidly expressed to George Tenet, “Some 
wars are justifiable, but not this one.”191                                                                                                  
In February 2003, a month before the invasion of Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz squared off against General Eric Shinseki, the presiding US Army Chief of Staff, over 
the number of troops needed to secure post-war Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein.  In a hearing on Capitol Hill, Wolfowitz called the troop estimate of several hundred 
thousand recommended by General Shinseki as “wildly off the mark.”192  Wolfowitz asserted 
that it was “impossible” to predict the duration of any war, the extent of destruction in any war, 
and the extent of the rebuilding process inherent in any post-war strategy.193  Wolfowitz went on 
to state: “we have no idea what we will need until we get there on the ground.”194  In response 
Representative James P. Moran (Virginia-D) countered: ‘“I think you’re deliberately keeping us 
in the dark.”’195  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld supported his immediate underling, 
Wolfowitz, in describing the requirement of several hundred thousand troops as “far off the 
                                                          
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid, 13.  
191 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 323.  
192  Eric Schmitt, “Threats and Responses: Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq 
Occupation Force’s Size,” in nytimes.com, 28 February 2003 <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-
responses-military-spending-pentagon-contradicts-general-iraq-occupation.html> (12 Aug. 2015).    
193 Ibid.  
194 Ibid.  
195 Ibid.  
46 
 
mark.”196  Meanwhile, Rumsfeld was pushing Commanding General Tommy Franks of US 
Central Command to apply “precise, overwhelming…U.S. military power… [that] would exploit 
speed, surprise, and pinpoint firepower not just to defeat Saddam with far fewer troops…but 
essentially to decapitate the Baathist regime without destroying economic infrastructure.”197  
Wolfowitz described a smaller coalition peacekeeping force as “sufficient to police and rebuild 
postwar Iraq,” a nation according to Wolfowitz as having “no history of ethnic strife.”198  
Regarding the rebuilding process, Wolfowitz was confident that “nations that oppose war with 
Iraq would likely sign up to help rebuild it.”199  Wolfowitz was quick to downplay the multi-
billion dollar estimates that would be needed to rebuild Iraq.  He said, “Estimates were almost 
meaningless because of the variables,” claiming that a ninety-five billion dollar rebuilding price 
tag would be an overestimate.200  Rumsfeld advanced that notion, repeating that cost ranges were 
pure speculation.  To put cost-relative matters to rest, Wolfowitz conclusively highlighted that 
Iraq’s wealth measured in oil exports valued between fifteen and twenty billion dollars per year 
and could help pay for the nation’s rebuilding efforts.201  A month before the invasion of Iraq, 
Wolfowitz and his superior at the Department of Defense, Rumsfeld, dismissed the 
recommendation of adequate preparation for the possibility of a protracted occupation phase as 
advised by the top brass of the US Army.   
On February 5, 2003, the United States represented by Secretary of State Colin Powell 
with CIA Director George Tenet seated directly behind him appealed to the United Nations to 
remove Saddam Hussein.  Powell came to the presentation equipped with numerous satellite 
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photos, claiming the ‘“existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents”’ 
carrying the potential capacity to ‘“kill thousands upon thousands of people.”’202  According to 
Tenet, the goal the CIA had for the UN speech was to “come up with rhetoric…supported by 
underlying intelligence and worthy of what we all hoped would be a defining moment.”203  Also 
echoed was Powell’s reenergized insistence that Baghdad and Al-Qaeda were cooperating with 
one another in launching future poison gas attacks on the US with the additional US assertion 
that it had a decade’s worth of proof that Saddam was “determined to acquire nuclear 
weapons.”’204  In turn, the American media proclaimed Powell’s speech as being ‘“Impressive,”’ 
‘“Masterful,”’ ‘“Overwhelming,”’ and ‘“Case Closed.”’205  Despite the CIA’s best efforts of 
monitoring what went into the Powell UN speech, flawed information had made its way into the 
final draft.  George Tenet acknowledged with candid detail in his 2007 memoir that he had 
overseen an intelligence agency that had allowed for “flawed information to be presented to 
Congress, the president, the United Nations, and the world.”206 
Unleashing War in Iraq 
The Second Persian Gulf War commenced on the night of March 19, 2003, with televised 
coverage of the US military’s aptly named “Shock and Awe” initial bombing campaign over the 
capital, Baghdad, aimed at eradicating Saddam Hussein while also liquidating principal figures 
in the Baathist political regime.  From its opening shot, the war coverage was filtered through a 
ceaselessly churning twenty-four hour news cycle designed to keep the American viewer 
entranced and, moreover, to have the American patriot remain unabatingly supportive of the war 
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effort.  Six weeks later on May 1, 2003, while aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln with a 
grandiose “Mission Accomplished” banner hanging behind him, President Bush announced in a 
nationally televised speech an end to major combat operations in Iraq.  He was immediately met 
with an ensuing round of cheers from the troops in attendance aboard the naval carrier as well as 
further praise from the pundits embedded within the neoconservative enclave. 
By the fall of 2003, the homegrown Sunni insurgency, gaining rapid traction from the 
demoralization it felt due to the American-controlled dissolution of the Sunni-dominated Iraqi 
Army in addition to the inopportunity for ex-Baathist officials to participate in the rebuilding of a 
new central Iraqi government, was steadily escalating its waves of entrenched violence across 
Iraq marked by more frequent deadly attacks against the Iraqi Shia community in addition to 
coalition forces.  In particular, the August 7, 2003, bombing of the Jordanian embassy in 
Baghdad sent shockwaves throughout the American military command, a foreboding message of 
dire times ahead for the strained Islamic sectarian communities in Iraq, and a call for Islamic 
extremists to flock to Iraq to join groups such as the newly established chapter of Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq.  Two months later in October 2003, a neoconservative assessment of the war emerged with 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol collaborating on an article for The Weekly Standard entitled 
“Why We Went to War.”  Kagan and Kristol stressed for the US to remain committed in Iraq for 
the sake of rebuilding the war-weary country while also reminding Americans of the tyrannical 
threat the US had disposed of when it removed Saddam Hussein from power.207  The overarching 
reason Kagan and Kristol provided for the US launching a war against Iraq was to eliminate the 
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strategic threat posed by Saddam attributed to his track record of aggression and barbarity 
throughout the Middle East.208 
Kristol and Kagan’s “Why We Went to War” strove to remind The Weekly Standard 
readership as well as the American public at large of the evidence the co-authors had been 
pointing to for years in making the case to oust Saddam Hussein from power.  The pair painted 
the case of Iraq as a glimpse into a new century involving a greater number of rogue states armed 
with WMDs.  Had the US not intervened in Iraq, Kagan and Kristol argued, Saddam would have 
been further emboldened to “act with impunity” while persuading rogue leaders across the world 
to act with similar flagrancy.  In the 1990s, the Iraqis had refused to produce credible evidence of 
them having ‘“secretly”’ destroyed chemical and biological weapons.  After 1996, Saddam had 
blocked certain buildings and warehouses to be analyzed by UN weapons inspectors, and at the 
end of 1997 the Iraqi leader had demanded the removal of all Americans from the UN weapons 
inspection team.  Kagan and Kristol raised these points to remind Americans that Saddam had 
long been uncooperative with joint American and international efforts to monitor Iraq’s weapons 
programs.209 
In their October 2003 Weekly Standard article, Kagan and Kristol highlighted Saddam 
Hussein’s isolation of the Clinton Administration.  They also coyly credited themselves with 
spurring President Clinton to act on Iraq by alluding to the PNAC’s January 1998 letter to the 
president as well as mentioning the pivotal February 1998 speech given by President Clinton that 
spoke to America as to why war against Iraq was proving necessary.  The co-authors reiterated 
how Iraq did not comply with UN Resolution 1441 which demanded that the country clearly 
detail the layout of its WMD program within thirty days.  Kagan and Kristol’s article, in effect, 
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was aimed at convincing the “conspiratorialists” and those claiming that Saddam’s removal was 
fraudulent that the US had waged a proper recourse in subduing a menace in the Middle East.210 
Conclusion: An Insidious D.C. Soap Opera Reminiscent of a Shakespearean Tragedy 
2006 witnessed the termination of the Project for the New American Century while also 
marking a horrifically violent year in Iraq.  By year’s end, the Bush Administration was at a 
critical juncture with Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, and Colin Powell all having vacated the 
president’s hawkish inner circle.  In turn, Condoleezza Rice assumed the role of US Secretary of 
State during President Bush’s second term in office.  George Tenet stepped down from his post 
as CIA Director in 2004.  The PNAC never provided a set of reasons as to why they were 
permanently dismantling their think tank.  However if one were to glance at the bigger picture 
playing out with a raging inferno of an insurgency sending Iraq into an abyss, it is easier to 
surmise why their mission of delivering American democracy to a longtime autocratic state such 
as Iraq had ultimately failed.   
The PNAC’s grand vision of promoting democracy via unchallenged American 
unilateralism in a country such as Iraq, which had never been accustomed to even the faintest 
semblance of an Americanized set of freedom and open society principles, had quickly 
metastasized into a seemingly irreparable, festering black mark on President Bush’s foreign 
policy record.  By 2006, no weapons of mass destruction inside Iraq had been found, and Al-
Qaeda in Iraq, then under the command of Jordanian militant Islamist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
was stronger than ever.  Islamic extremists exploited the already volatile fault lines pitting the 
Shia and Sunni communities of Iraq against one another.  These Iraqi groups had felt exasperated 
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by the De-Ba’athification process in 2003 under the direction of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority under the leadership of Presidential Envoy to Iraq Lewis Paul Bremer III which had 
liquidated the former Iraqi army.  De-Ba’athification, ushering in a gaping absence of Sunni 
representation in Iraqi civilian affairs, had nefariously manifested the sectarian divide into a 
pugnacious hotbed of radical Islamic fundamentalism at odds with the Shia-dominated Nouri al-
Maliki Administration.211  In 2006 the Iraq Study Group, a ten-person bipartisan panel, 
recommended a reappraisal of what was the “fundamental cause of violence in Iraq.”212  The 
group highlighted assessments from multiple American generals who voiced concern that 
“adding U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highly localized area.”213  
However, if the Iraqi government did not actively strive to foster cooperation between the Shia 
and Sunni community, ‘“all the troops in the world will not provide security”’ to an appallingly 
fractured Iraqi society.214      
Key figures involved with the PNAC have since moved on to other academic, media, and 
policy endeavors.  William Kristol is still the editor of The Weekly Standard, while Robert 
Kagan currently sits as a senior fellow on the Project on International Order and Strategy at the 
Brookings Institute.  Influential Iraq War promoter, Richard Perle, is currently at the Institute for 
Policy Studies.  All three were contacted for interview requests, and all three either declined or 
chose not to respond.  These neoconservatives, along with many others, have successfully 
avoided shouldering any of the blame for the quagmire that the Iraq War devolved into due, in 
part, to their faulty analysis and unbending, impetuous rhetoric in the years leading up to the 
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commencement of the war.  What became quite a noticeable conundrum much to the detriment 
of the credibility of the Bush Administration’s war strategy, especially once the Iraq War had 
commenced in 2003, was the fact that nearly all of the leading PNAC intellectuals and policy-
wielding architects of the Iraq War had never personally experienced combat.  This compelled 
many of their critics to denounce them with the unsavory, political term of “chicken hawks,” 
meaning those who actively strive for war but who avoided military service when they had come 
of age.   
Many of the leading PNAC intellectuals have all since eased into similar positions of 
relative influence and stature at other policy institutes that currently provide foreign policy 
advice to many of the 2016 Republican presidential candidates.  The neoconservative ideological 
stalwarts, once comprising the clandestine PNAC spanning two presidential administrations, still 
wield enormous influence inside and outside the deep D.C. bureaucracy in both the public and 
private sector.  These public intellectuals found their voices at the end of the Cold War, at a time 
of a rapidly transforming global political landscape, overshadowed by an emergent American 
unipolarism.  They tend to operate with greater efficiency and impunity when their frameworks 
for foreign policy, chiefly characterized by American hegemony and preemption, continue to go 
largely unnoticed by the public.  They tend to fly (operate) below the radar and not accept any 
responsibility for their bold, yet often faulty counsel.                          
            
 
 
53 
 
Bibliography 
I. Primary Sources 
Web Archives: 
 
I. Central Intelligence Agency 
- This archive provides copies of NIE and NIC estimates and analysis on Iraq’s 
WMD programs.  This archive encapsulates a perspective concerned with 
logistics and credible data from the side of the intelligence community with no 
biases towards a specific US policy.   
 
II. National Security Archives 
- This archive, through its many documents related to both the president’s 
administration and the military sector, provides a perspective of the direction and 
momentum of US policy on Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s with specific attention 
paid to the development of US war plans and strategies against Iraq as well as 
detailed reports of Iraq’s WMD programs. 
 
III. The Weekly Standard 
- This database of older WS publications reveals critiques, rhetoric, and 
suppositions written by many members of the PNAC, highlighting and 
scrutinizing the threat Saddam Hussein of Iraq posed to US security and strategic 
interests.  Throughout the lead-up to war with Iraq, The Weekly Standard 
tirelessly bolstered its argument to launch war against Iraq to protect America 
with markedly heightened fervor post-9/11. 
 
Source Collections Books: 
 
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States: Official Government Edition. Official Government ed. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2004.  
 
Baker, James, and Lee Hamilton. The Iraq Study Group Report. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 
2006.  
 
Perle, Richard. "Iraq: Saddam Unbound." In Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in 
American Foreign and Defense Policy, 99-110. New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2000. 
 
Prados, John. Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War. New York, 
NY: New Press, 2004. 
54 
 
 
 Sifry, Micah L., and Christopher Cerf. The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. 
New York, NY: Touchstone, 2003. 
 
Memoirs: 
 
Bush, George W. Decision Points. New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group, 2010.   
 
Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir. New York, 
NY: Threshold Editions, 2011. 
 
Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. 
New York, NY: Harper, 2008.   
  
Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. New York, NY: 
Crown Publishers, 2011. 
 
Rumsfeld, Donald. Known and Unknown: A Memoir. New York, NY: Sentinel, 2011. 
 
Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York, 
NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007.    
         
Web Sources: 
 
"George W. Bush Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, 
New York—June 1, 2002." Presidential Rhetoric. June 1, 2002. Accessed January 11, 
2016. http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html.  
 
"Is This the Roadmap That Bush and Blair Keep Talking About?" Project for the New American 
Century (PNAC). "Lead the World to Victory": September 20, 2001. Accessed August 
25, 2015. http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/NAC304A.html. 
  
"Lincoln Chafee Grills Paul Wolfowitz in '03 Senate Hearing." YouTube. May 17, 2007. 
Accessed August 3, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6J7T06aBgA4. 
  
"PNAC-----Statement of Principles." June 3, 1997. Accessed May 3, 2015. 
http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/pfpc/PNAC---statement%20of%20principles.pdf. 
  
"Secretary Rumsfeld Delivers Major Speech on Transformation." Secretary Rumsfeld Delivers 
Major Speech on Transformation. January 31, 2002. Accessed September 23, 2015. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/transformation-secdef-31jan02.htm. 
 
"Text Of Clinton Statement On Iraq." CNN. February 17, 1998. Accessed August 17, 2015. 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/02/17/transcripts/clinton.iraq/. 
55 
 
 
Donnelly, Thomas. "REBUILDING AMERICA’S DEFENSES: Strategy, Forces and Resources 
For a New Century." Information Clearing House. September 1, 2000. 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf. 
 
Khalilzad, Zalmay, and Paul Wolfowitz. "WE MUST LEAD THE WAY IN DEPOSING 
SADDAM." Washington Post. November 9, 1997. Accessed August 28, 2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1997/11/09/we-must-lead-the-way-in-
deposing-saddam/e7109ca0-6545-459e-b6e2-fd29b7e44e09/.  
   
Tenet, George J. "Iraq And Weapons Of Mass Destruction." Vital Speeches Of The Day 70, no. 9 
(February 15, 2004): 258-264. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 
November 22, 2015).   
 
II. Secondary Sources 
 
Books: 
 
Anderson, Terry H. Bush's Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
Brands, Hal. What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Stagecraft from 
Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. 
 
Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign 
Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.  
   
Draper, Robert. Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush. First ed. New York, NY: 
Free Press, 2007. 
 
Frum, David, and Richard Perle. An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror. New York, 
NY: Random House, 2003. 
 
Immerman, Richard. Empire for Liberty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
 
Klare, Michael T. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign 
Policy. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1996. 
 
Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. New York, NY: Penguin 
Books, 2004. 
 
Medvetz, Thomas. Think Tanks in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
 
56 
 
Murray, Williamson, and Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. The Iraq War: A Military History. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003.  
  
Vaïsse, Justin. Neoconservatism: The Biography Of A Movement, 220-270. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010. 
 
Velasco, Jesus. Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy under Ronald Reagan and George W. 
Bush: Voices behind the Throne. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2010. 
 
Journal Articles: 
 
Boot, Max. "Neocons." Foreign Policy, no. 140 (2004): 20-22, 24, 26, 28. 
 
Kagan, Robert. "Power and Weakness." Policy Review, no. 113 (2002): 3-28. 
 
Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 
75, no. 4 (1996): 18-32. 
 
Wiarda, Howard J. "The New Powerhouses: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy." American 
Foreign Policy Interests 30, no. 2 (February 2008): 96-117.    
 
Web Sources: 
 
"C.I.A. Letter to Senate on Baghdad's Intentions." International New York Times. October 9, 
2002. Accessed August 15, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/09/international/09TTEX.html. 
 
Arin, Kubilay Yado. "The Impact of Neoconservative Think Tanks on American Foreign 
Policy." E-International Relations. May 26, 2014. Accessed August 19, 2015. 
http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/26/the-impact-of-neoconservative-think-tanks-on-american-
foreign-policy/. 
 
Dror, Yehezkel.  “Required Breakthroughs in Think Tanks,” Policy Sciences Vol. 16, No. 3 
(1984): 199-225, www.jstor.org. 
       
Hersh, Seymour. "The Stovepipe." The New Yorker. October 27, 2003. Accessed August 23, 
2015. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/10/27/the-stovepipe. 
 
McAdams, Daniel. "The Neocon Foreign Policy Walmart." The Ron Paul Institute for Peace and 
Prosperity. August 30, 2015. Accessed September 1, 2015. 
http://www.ronpaulinstitute.org/archives/neocon-watch/2015/august/30/the-neocon-
foreign-policy-walmart/.   
57 
 
 
McGann, James. "2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report." Think Tanks and Civil 
Societies Program. Accessed February 4, 2015.  
http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/8.   
 
McGann, James.  "Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US." Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, USA 3 (2005):1-33, https://oi2-
test3.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/a6a2ba2e2ef420be7d7c45308fb04134a8ca47fc.pdf. 
 
Roberts, Joel. "Plans For Iraq Attack Began On 9/11." CBSNews. September 4, 2002. Accessed 
August 28, 2015. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/plans-for-iraq-attack-began-on-9-11/. 
   
Schmitt, Eric. "Threats and Responses: Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts General On 
Iraq Occupation Force's Size." The New York Times. February 28, 2003. Accessed 
August 12, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-responses-military-
spending-pentagon-contradicts-general-iraq-occupation.html.    
 
  
58 
 
Vita 
Dan McCoy was born in Chicago, Illinois, on January 8, 1988.  He earned his Bachelor 
of Arts in History with a concentration in European History from 1500 to the present at St. 
Edward’s University in May 2011.  He joined the University of New Orleans in August 2014 to 
pursue a History M.A. with a focus on international and global studies.  He is an active drummer 
in the New Orleans punk and metal community.  With a wanderlust for travel, he boasts that to 
date his favorite trip has been to Jordan and the Dead Sea taken in 2012 while working alongside 
Habitat for Humanity and America’s Unofficial Ambassadors.                   
 
              
 
                       
              
                                             
 
                                                 
 
              
               
